| I. Games of Complete Information |
| 1 |
Normal Form Games I |
This session covers dominant strategies, pure strategies, mixed strategies, and Nash equilibrium.
Examples include the prisoners' dilemma, battle of the sexes, matching pennies, and chicken. |
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| 2 |
Normal Form Games II |
This session covers continuous strategy spaces.
Examples include the duopoly, and spatial electoral competition. |
Problem set 1 due five days after lecture 2 |
| 3 |
Normal Form Games III |
This session covers more than two players.
Examples include "truel," oligopoly, and tragedy of the commons. |
Problem set 2 due |
| 4 |
Normal Form Games IV |
Examples include rent-seeking, lobbying, and resource allocation. |
Problem set 3 due |
| 5 |
Extensive Form Games I |
This session covers backwards induction, and subgame perfect equilibrium.
Examples include the centipede game, the Stackelberg duopoly, and legislative rules. |
Problem set 4 due |
| 6 |
Extensive Form Games II |
Examples include 2-player sequential bargaining, and bargaining in legislatures. |
Problem set 5 due three days after lecture 6 |
| 7 |
Extensive Form Games III |
Examples include sophisticated voting and agenda control. |
Problem set 6 due |
| 8 |
Repeated Games |
Examples include the development of cooperation, and overlapping generations. |
Problem set 7 due |
| II. Games of Incomplete Information |
| 9 |
Normal Form Games |
This session covers Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Examples include the battle of the sexes again, auctions, and the revelation principle. |
Problem set 8 due |
| 10 |
Extensive Form Games I |
This session covers perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Examples include signaling games and nuclear deterrence. |
Problem set 9 due |
| 11 |
Extensive Form Games II |
Examples include cheap talk and the informational role of committees. |
Problem set 10 due |
| 12 |
Extensive Form Games III |
Examples include the reputations. |
Problem set 11 due |